# Cline

> Cline is a community-maintained IDE extension from Cline. Anomity scores its risk at 100 out of 100 (critical). It matches 4 dangerous capability combinations.

- **Canonical URL:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/cline
- **Kind:** IDE extension
- **Publisher:** Cline
- **Trust level:** community
- **Risk score:** 100/100 (critical)
- **Website:** https://cline.bot
- **Last updated:** 2026-09-02
- **JSON:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/api/entries/extension/cline

## Description

Cline is an autonomous coding agent that runs inside VS Code and takes the IDE far beyond autocomplete. Once approved, it can read and edit files across your repository, execute shell commands in the integrated terminal, browse the web, and call external tools through MCP servers — all while showing each step for human approval. The project is open source, published on the VS Code Marketplace, and updated frequently by a community-led team.

From a capability standpoint, the extension declares full filesystem read and write access, shell execution inside the workspace, outbound network access to its model provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, OpenRouter, Bedrock, Vertex, and local models), and access to your stored API credentials. Combined, those capabilities are powerful enough to refactor a service, install dependencies, and ship a PR without leaving the editor.

The risk profile reflects that surface area. Cline is community-maintained rather than vendor-published, which lowers its trust adjustment. The pairing of shell execution with outbound network access matches Anomity's data-exfiltration combination, and filesystem write paired with credential access matches the credential-theft combination. Teams that adopt Cline should pair it with allow-listed commands, scoped credentials, and a strict approval workflow rather than the agent's auto-approve mode.

## Why it scored 100

The score starts at the catalog's neutral base of 50 and moves only through the signals below. The formula is published at https://catalog.anomity.ai/about — there is no model and no hidden heuristic.

| Signal | Contribution | Severity | Evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Established community project | -10 | trust offset |  |
| 3 high-risk capabilities: filesystem:write, shell:execute, credentials:access | +30 | critical |  |
| Data exfiltration risk (high) | +15 | high | Shell execution combined with outbound network access can exfiltrate arbitrary data from the machine. |
| Credential theft risk (high) | +15 | high | Filesystem write combined with credentials access can plant persistent credential stealers. |
| Persistence + execution risk (medium) | +5 | medium | Shell execution plus filesystem write means the agent can plant persistent backdoors (e.g. modifying startup scripts). |
| Full-control risk (critical) | +25 | critical | Shell + filesystem write + network is effectively a remote shell on the employee machine. |

Clamped result: **100/100**, band **critical**.

## Capabilities

| Capability | Name | Security implication |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `filesystem:read` | Filesystem read | Can read files on the host system. Used for context, indexing, or analysis. |
| `filesystem:write` | Filesystem write | Can create, edit, or delete files on the host system. High-impact capability — anything from helpful edits to planting persistence. |
| `shell:execute` | Shell execution | Can run arbitrary shell commands. Combined with network access this becomes effectively a remote shell. |
| `network:outbound` | Outbound network | Can make outbound network requests. Required for hosted model providers and remote APIs; also the path for data exfiltration if combined with read access. |
| `credentials:access` | Credentials access | Reads provider API keys, OAuth tokens, or other secrets from the host keychain or environment. |

## Dangerous combinations matched

### Data exfiltration risk (high)

Shell execution combined with outbound network access can exfiltrate arbitrary data from the machine.

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `network:outbound`

### Credential theft risk (high)

Filesystem write combined with credentials access can plant persistent credential stealers.

Capabilities: `filesystem:write`, `credentials:access`

### Persistence + execution risk (medium)

Shell execution plus filesystem write means the agent can plant persistent backdoors (e.g. modifying startup scripts).

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `filesystem:write`

### Full-control risk (critical)

Shell + filesystem write + network is effectively a remote shell on the employee machine.

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `filesystem:write`, `network:outbound`

## Related IDE extensions

- [Claude Code for VS Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/claude-code-for-vscode) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Kilo Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/kilo-code) — risk 100 (critical)
- [OpenAI Codex for VS Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/openai-codex-vscode) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Roo Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/roo-code) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Refact.ai](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/refact-ai) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Continue](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/continue) — risk 75 (high)

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Source: Anomity Catalog (https://catalog.anomity.ai/). Scoring methodology: https://catalog.anomity.ai/about. Machine-readable index: https://catalog.anomity.ai/llms.txt · https://catalog.anomity.ai/openapi.json