# Roo Code

> Roo Code is a community-maintained IDE extension from Roo Code. Anomity scores its risk at 100 out of 100 (critical). It matches 4 dangerous capability combinations.

- **Canonical URL:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/roo-code
- **Kind:** IDE extension
- **Publisher:** Roo Code
- **Trust level:** community
- **Risk score:** 100/100 (critical)
- **Website:** https://roocode.com
- **Last updated:** 2026-09-02
- **JSON:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/api/entries/extension/roo-code

## Description

Roo Code is an open-source AI coding agent for VS Code, originally forked from Cline and now developed independently with expanded provider support, more granular permission modes, and a community focused on configurability. Like its upstream, Roo Code can drive an entire feature end-to-end: planning a change, editing files in batches, running tests in the terminal, and reaching out to MCP servers for additional tools.

The extension's declared capabilities span filesystem read and write across the workspace, shell execution for builds and tests, outbound network connections to the configured LLM provider, and access to provider API keys and tokens stored in the secret store. Operators can install custom "modes" that further widen or narrow that surface — for example, an architect mode that can plan but not execute, or a code mode with the full toolbelt.

Because Roo Code is community-maintained and inherits the shell + network + credentials trio, it triggers both the data-exfiltration and credential-theft dangerous combinations in Anomity's catalog. The recommended posture is to enable the most restrictive mode that meets the team's need, restrict tools at the MCP server level, and avoid running it under accounts that hold production credentials.

## Why it scored 100

The score starts at the catalog's neutral base of 50 and moves only through the signals below. The formula is published at https://catalog.anomity.ai/about — there is no model and no hidden heuristic.

| Signal | Contribution | Severity | Evidence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Established community project | -10 | trust offset |  |
| 3 high-risk capabilities: filesystem:write, shell:execute, credentials:access | +30 | critical |  |
| Data exfiltration risk (high) | +15 | high | Shell execution combined with outbound network access can exfiltrate arbitrary data from the machine. |
| Credential theft risk (high) | +15 | high | Filesystem write combined with credentials access can plant persistent credential stealers. |
| Persistence + execution risk (medium) | +5 | medium | Shell execution plus filesystem write means the agent can plant persistent backdoors (e.g. modifying startup scripts). |
| Full-control risk (critical) | +25 | critical | Shell + filesystem write + network is effectively a remote shell on the employee machine. |

Clamped result: **100/100**, band **critical**.

## Capabilities

| Capability | Name | Security implication |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `filesystem:read` | Filesystem read | Can read files on the host system. Used for context, indexing, or analysis. |
| `filesystem:write` | Filesystem write | Can create, edit, or delete files on the host system. High-impact capability — anything from helpful edits to planting persistence. |
| `shell:execute` | Shell execution | Can run arbitrary shell commands. Combined with network access this becomes effectively a remote shell. |
| `network:outbound` | Outbound network | Can make outbound network requests. Required for hosted model providers and remote APIs; also the path for data exfiltration if combined with read access. |
| `credentials:access` | Credentials access | Reads provider API keys, OAuth tokens, or other secrets from the host keychain or environment. |

## Dangerous combinations matched

### Data exfiltration risk (high)

Shell execution combined with outbound network access can exfiltrate arbitrary data from the machine.

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `network:outbound`

### Credential theft risk (high)

Filesystem write combined with credentials access can plant persistent credential stealers.

Capabilities: `filesystem:write`, `credentials:access`

### Persistence + execution risk (medium)

Shell execution plus filesystem write means the agent can plant persistent backdoors (e.g. modifying startup scripts).

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `filesystem:write`

### Full-control risk (critical)

Shell + filesystem write + network is effectively a remote shell on the employee machine.

Capabilities: `shell:execute`, `filesystem:write`, `network:outbound`

## Related IDE extensions

- [Claude Code for VS Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/claude-code-for-vscode) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Cline](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/cline) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Kilo Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/kilo-code) — risk 100 (critical)
- [OpenAI Codex for VS Code](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/openai-codex-vscode) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Refact.ai](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/refact-ai) — risk 100 (critical)
- [Continue](https://catalog.anomity.ai/extension/continue) — risk 75 (high)

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Source: Anomity Catalog (https://catalog.anomity.ai/). Scoring methodology: https://catalog.anomity.ai/about. Machine-readable index: https://catalog.anomity.ai/llms.txt · https://catalog.anomity.ai/openapi.json