# binding-gyp-supply-chain-attack-enables-npm-ci-cd-worm-propagation: binding.gyp Supply Chain Attack Enables npm CI/CD Worm Propagation

> binding.gyp Supply Chain Attack Enables npm CI/CD Worm Propagation is a high-severity supply chain compromise issue in binding.gyp Supply Chain Attack Enables npm CI/CD Worm Propa, a CI integration. Affected: 57+ npm packages / 286+ malicious versions with phantom binding.gyp (Miasma wave 2, June 3-4 2026). It has been exploited in the wild.

- **Canonical URL:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/vuln/binding-gyp-supply-chain-attack-enables-npm-ci-cd-worm-propagation
- **Aliases:** ti-040
- **Severity:** high
- **Attack type:** Supply chain compromise, Malware
- **Component:** binding.gyp Supply Chain Attack Enables npm CI/CD Worm Propa (CI integration)
- **Exploited in the wild:** yes
- **Published:** 2026-06-04
- **Last verified:** 2026-11-01
- **JSON:** https://catalog.anomity.ai/api/entries/vuln/binding-gyp-supply-chain-attack-enables-npm-ci-cd-worm-propagation

## Summary

Researchers identified an active npm supply-chain attack that abuses the binding.gyp build mechanism to execute malicious code during install via node-gyp, bypassing many controls that only watch preinstall/postinstall scripts. The worm propagates across packages through CI/CD. Linked to TeamPCP.

## Affected versions

| Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- |
| 57+ npm packages / 286+ malicious versions with phantom binding.gyp (Miasma wave 2, June 3-4 2026) | no fixed version listed |

## Am I affected by this vulnerability?

You are affected if you run 57+ npm packages / 286+ malicious versions with phantom binding.gyp (Miasma wave 2, June 3-4 2026).

## How do I fix it?

Audit dependencies for unexpected binding.gyp / node-gyp build steps; disable native build scripts for untrusted packages (e.g. npm --ignore-scripts in CI) and review CI runners for worm propagation since early June.

## References

- article: https://snyk.io/blog/node-gyp-supply-chain-compromise-self-propagating-npm-worm-binding-gyp/

## Related vulnerabilities

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Source: Anomity Security Database (https://catalog.anomity.ai/vuln). Detect affected AI tools on developer devices: https://anomity.ai/?utm_source=catalog&utm_medium=vuln-md&utm_campaign=binding-gyp-supply-chain-attack-enables-npm-ci-cd-worm-propagation