VSCode Fork "Recommended Extension" Namespace Squatting Supply Chain Attack
VSCode Fork "Recommended Extension" Namespace Squatting Supply Chain Attack is a high-severity supply chain compromise issue in Cursor, an IDE extension. Affected: Cursor, Windsurf, Trae (all VSCode forks using OpenVSX).
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Key facts
- ID
vscode-fork-recommended-extension-namespace-squatting-supply-chain- Severity
- high
- Attack type
- Supply chain compromise
- Component
- Cursor · IDE extension
- Known exploited
- No known exploitation
- Published
- Last verified
What is this vulnerability?
AI-powered IDEs forked from VS Code (Cursor, Windsurf, Google Antigravity, Trae) inherit Microsoft's hardcoded extension recommendation lists but pull from OpenVSX, where many recommended namespaces were unclaimed. Any attacker could register those namespaces and serve malicious payloads as "officially recommended" installs. Koi Security disclosed the issue; campaigns exploiting similar gaps infected 17,000+ developers.
Affected versions
| Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|
Cursor, Windsurf, Trae (all VSCode forks using OpenVSX) | No fixed version listed |
Am I affected by this vulnerability?
You are affected if you run Cursor, Windsurf, Trae (all VSCode forks using OpenVSX).
How do I fix it?
Review installed extensions against known-good publishers. Block auto-install of recommended extensions. Use publisher allowlists in your extension policy.
How do I find every machine running Cursor?
Anomity inventories the AI agents, MCP servers, IDE extensions and skills on each developer device, so you can see which machines run Cursor and which version, then enforce a policy on it.